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Anti-Assignment Provisions,
Copyright Licenses, and Intra-Group Mergers:
The Effect of Cincom v. Novelis
By H. Justin Pace ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

At first blush, the decision in Cincom Systems, Inc. v. Novelis Corp. inspires an
almost knee-jerk negative reaction. 1 It strikes one as unfair and arbitrary that an antiassignment provision in an intellectual property license would be triggered by a series of
mergers within a single operating company (intra-group mergers) when no substantive
change results. 2 However, upon closer examination of the relevant law and competing
interests, it becomes clear that the court came to a decision that is correct, if perhaps
otherwise open to criticism. 3
In Cincom, the Sixth Circuit addressed whether a series of intra-group mergers
resulted in the contractually impermissible transfer of a non-assignable copyright
license. 4 The court held that the intra-group mergers did result in a transfer of the license
and that said transfer was impermissible. For unrelated business purposes, Alcan Ohio,
the original holder of the license, merged into Alcan Corporation, a corporate affiliate.
Alcan Corporation was then merged into three subsidiaries (each a Texas corporation).
The plant and computer containing the software in question, without physically moving,
became assets of Alcan Fabrication Corporation, which subsequently changed its name to
Novelis Corporation. 5 There is no evidence to suggest that any of these corporations
were not part of the same corporate family; that is, a single corporation controlled all of
the corporations involved.
Cincom, the owner of the software copyright, sued Novelis for copyright
infringement, claiming the license was impermissibly transferred as a result of the intra∗

Candidate for Juris Doctor, Northwestern University School of Law, 2011. Special thanks to
Professors Presser and DiCola for their insight and comments.
1
581 F.3d 431 (6th Cir. 2009).
2
Anti-assignment provisions prohibit the transfer of the contract to another party. This Note will focus
on anti-assignment provisions in patent and copyright licenses. Mergers result in the transfer of contracts
as an operation of law.
3
This Note will attempt to differentiate between internal, or non-acquisitive, and external, or
acquisitive, mergers as applicable throughout the text. As a general rule, the use of the term intra-group
merger will indicate a non-acquisitive, internal change in corporate form. The difficulties differentiating
between internal and external mergers will be explored in Part IV. Bankruptcy reorganizations are outside
of the scope of this Note.
4
581 F.3d 431.
5
Cincom Sys., Inc. v. Novelis Corp., No. 1:05CV152, 2007 WL 128999, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 12,
2007), aff’d, 581 F.3d 431 (6th Cir. 2009). For the sake of simplicity, I will refer both to the final corporate
entity and its predecessors as Novelis throughout this Note, except where more accurate distinctions are
needed for clarity.
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group mergers. The district court relied on federal common law to determine that the
license was not assignable 6 and relied on Ohio law to determine that a transfer had in fact
occurred. 7 On that basis, the district court granted summary judgment in part for the
plaintiff (while encouraging an appeal of its ruling). 8
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. 9 In doing so, the
court rejected Novelis’s arguments that the non-assignability provision in the licensing
agreement was not intended to cover intra-group mergers 10 and that a change in Ohio
corporate law should be interpreted as vesting contracts in the new entity post-merger
without a transfer. 11 The court rejected Novelis’s contract intent claim based on the plain
meaning of the contract. Furthermore, the court rejected Novelis’s functionalist
interpretation of Ohio corporate law in favor of a formalist interpretation. 12
This Note argues that the formalist approach that should be applied for intellectual
property licenses transferred by operation of law due to traditional corporate acquisitions
should also be applied to transfers resulting from intra-group mergers. Part II of this
Note provides a legal analysis of the circuit court decision in Cincom, concentrating on
the conclusions of the respective courts in regard to corporate, contract, and intellectual
property law. Part III explores the implications of the Cincom decision to both merger
decision-making and contract negotiation. Part IV argues for the application of a
formalist approach to non-acquisitive mergers. Part IV also explores and dismisses
alternative approaches.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF APPELLATE COURT DECISION

¶6

¶7

At the time that Cincom was decided, it had been well established that a transfer as
the result of a merger could violate an anti-assignment provision of an intellectual
property license. 13 However, it is worthwhile to reexamine whether the court properly
determined that the license in question was not transferred by operation of law. If the
license was not transferred by operation of law, then the next question is whether federal
common law for copyrights or Ohio state common law for contracts should have been
applied. Under either standard, it must be determined whether the anti-assignment
provision applies to a transfer within a single operating company.
The decision in Cincom touches upon intellectual property, contract, and corporate
law. 14 Part A analyzes the court’s interpretation of the applicable corporate law. Part B
6

Id. at *3.
Id. at *1–2.
8
Id. at *6–7 (“[The case] involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground
for difference of opinion, and an immediate appeal from the Order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation.”).
9
Cincom, 581 F.3d at 433.
10
Id. at 437–38.
11
Id. at 438.
12
Id. at 438–39.
13
See Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2002); SQL Solutions, Inc. v. Oracle Corp., No. C91–1079 MHP, 1991 WL 626458, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1991); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus.
Corp., 597 F.2d 1090 (6th Cir. 1979). Cf. Unarco Indus., Inc. v. Kelley Co., 465 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1972)
(holding a license agreement non-assignable absent language in agreement consenting to assignability).
14
Other areas of the law were touched upon as well, but for the purposes of this Note, only intellectual
property, contract, and corporate law will be considered.
7
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examines the applicable contract law. Part C examines the intellectual property law
applicable to Cincom.
A. Transfer by Operation of Law
¶8

One of the disadvantages of structuring a corporate acquisition as an asset purchase
is that contracts to be transferred must be assigned, and third-party consents are required
for any contracts containing anti-assignment provisions. 15 In a statutory merger, on the
other hand, contracts transfer by operation of law. The Model Business Corporation Act
of 1984 (MBCA) states that “every contract right possessed by, each corporation or
eligible entity that merges into the survivor is vested in the survivor without reversion or
impairment.” 16 The official comment to the MBCA further states that “a merger is not a
conveyance, transfer, or assignment” and that “it does not give rise to claims . . . based on
a prohibited conveyance, transfer, or assignment . . . unless the contract specifically
provides that it does not survive a merger.” 17
¶9
Novelis argued that, per its interpretation of the Ohio merger statute, the intragroup mergers resulted in the license residing with the end corporation without a legal
transfer that would trigger the anti-assignment provision in the license. 18 Novelis
attempted to distinguish the decision in PPG Industries, Inc. v. Guardian Industries
Corporation, an earlier Sixth Circuit case in which the court found that a merger
triggered the anti-assignability provision in a patent license, on the basis of a change in
the language of the Ohio merger statute.19 At the time PPG Industries was decided, the
Ohio statutory merger law indicated that upon completion of a merger, all contracts were
“deemed to be transferred to and vested in the surviving or new corporation.” 20 A
subsequent revision (prior to the Novelis merger transactions) to the law brought it in line
with the current MBCA by pointedly removing the word “transfer” entirely. 21 The Sixth
Circuit, however, reaffirmed its statement in PPG Industries that “a transfer is no less a
transfer because it takes place by operation of law rather than by a particular act of the
parties” notwithstanding the change in statutory language. 22
¶10
The Sixth Circuit was correct in noting that a transfer had still taken place. Indeed,
a transfer of some sort did occur in the sense that the legal entity that Cincom originally
contracted with, Alcan Ohio, is no longer in existence; the license is held by a different
legal entity. 23 The pertinent question is whether a transfer by operation of law triggers an
anti-assignment provision. Courts have typically held that they do not, 24 but it is to
15

See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 7.2.1(b) (2000).
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.07 (1984).
17
Id.
18
Cincom Sys., Inc. v. Novelis Corp., 581 F.3d 431, 437–38 (6th Cir. 2009).
19
Id. at 438.
20
Id. (citing PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 597 F.2d 1090, 1096 (6th Cir. 1979) (quoting
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.81(A)(4) (West 1955))).
21
Id. (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.82(A)(3) (West 2009)).
22
Id.
23
Cincom Sys. Inc. v. Novelis Corp., No. 1:05CV152, 2007 WL 128999, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 12,
2007), aff’d 581 F.3d 431 (6th Cir. 2009).
24
See 15 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 7090 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2008) (relying on Campbell v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan,
Inc., 238 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2001); United States Can Co. v. NLRB, 984 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1993); Health
16
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contract law and intellectual property law that we must look to determine whether the
anti-assignment provision in question was violated.
B. Contract Interpretation
There is a strong presumption of assignability for contracts. 25 This is merely a
default rule, however, and parties can contract around it. Courts will look first to the
plain meaning of the contract. 26 Ohio state courts have long held that the plain meaning
of the contract terms can be interpreted “in light of the surrounding circumstances and of
the object intended to be accomplished,” 27 and the exclusion of surrounding
circumstances in the inherently subjective interpretation of contract terms has been
rightly criticized. 28 Courts have also interpreted contracts to treat transfers by operation
of law differently than a transfer by assignment. Courts have typically interpreted a
transfer by operation of law as circumventing an anti-assignment provision.29 Rather,
they have required a contract term explicitly prohibiting transfer by merger. 30 This
reflects a strong presumption that parties did not intend for an anti-assignment provision
to cover a transfer by operation of law. Courts still have, however, looked to the effect of
the transfer on the other party. 31 This includes noting the lack of a substantive change
when a wholly-owned subsidiary merges into its parent. 32
¶12
The Sixth Circuit rejected the claim by Novelis that the contracting parties did not
intend the anti-assignment clause to apply to intra-group mergers, stating that the plain
text made clear that no transfers were permissible “without express written approval.” 33
In doing so, the court relied on the statement of the Supreme Court of Ohio in Cincinnati
Ins. Co v. CPS Holdings, Inc. that “when the language of a written contract is clear, a
court may look no further than the writing itself to find the intent of the parties.” 34 This
analysis was limited in two respects. First, the plain meaning rule requires courts to look
¶11

Alliance Network, Inc., v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 354 F. Supp. 2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); McNair v. Monsanto Co.,
279 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (M.D. Ga. 2003); Taylor v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 237 F. Supp. 2d 789 (E.D. Mich.
2002); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 566 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Del. 1983); Lightner v.
Boston & A. R. Co., 15 F. Cas. 514 (D. Mass. 1869)).
25
See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.71 (2d ed. 1993); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317 (1981) (“A contractual right can be assigned.”).
26
See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 3.10 (5th ed. 2003).
27
Ed Schmidt Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc. v. DaimlerChrysler Motors Co., 503 F. Supp. 2d 894, 899 n.6
(N.D. Ohio 2007) (quoting Morgan v. Boyer, 39 Ohio St. 324, 326 (Ohio 1883)).
28
PERILLO, supra note 26, at § 3.10 n.6 (relying on 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 24.7 (1998); JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, 9 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §§ 2461–62 (Chadbourn rev. 1981); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 629
(4th ed. 1998); Margaret N. Kniffin, A New Trend in Contract Interpretation: The Search for Reality as
Opposed to Virtual Reality, 74 OR. L. REV. 643 (1995); Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract
Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710 (1997)); Arthur L. Corbin, The
Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 189 (1965); Joseph H. Levie,
The Interpretation of Contracts in New York Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 N.Y. L.F. 350
(1964).
29
See FLETCHER, supra note 24, § 7090.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Cincom Sys., Inc. v. Novelis Corp., 581 F.3d 431, 438 (6th Cir. 2009).
34
Id. at 437 (quoting Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. CPS Holdings, Inc., 875 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 7 (Ohio 2007)).
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to the four corners of the document for its meaning, 35 and another provision in the
licensing contract stated that the “agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the
benefit of the parties and their respective successors and assigns” (successor provision). 36
The district and circuit courts failed to interpret the anti-assignability provision in light of
the successor provision. Second, the language of the contract is not entirely clear. A lack
of complete consistency in the treatment of the applicability of anti-assignability
provisions to transfers by operation of law and the implication to the intent of the antiassignability provision by the additional inclusion of a successor provision create
uncertainty as to the intent of the parties. Regardless, the anti-assignability provision
would not have been triggered by a transfer by operation of law purely under Ohio state
law. To the extent that the decision of the court implied that this was not the case and
that the anti-assignability provision would have been triggered but for the application of
federal common law, the decision was poorly worded.
C. Federal Preemption
Copyrights and patents are creatures of federal law. 37 Copyright and patent
licenses are contracts and as such are interpreted according to state law. 38 State contract
law, however, must be applied “in a manner that does not conflict with federal copyright
law and policy.” 39 Where there is a true conflict between federal and state law, federal
law controls. 40
¶14
A patent has attributes of personal property, and an interest in a patent may be
assigned or transferred. 41 A copyright has similar attributes. 42 Absent explicit language
to the contrary, however, non-exclusive patent and copyright licenses are not
assignable. 43 It is a presumption against assignability that governs under federal
common law, 44 not the presumption of assignability under state common law. 45 While it
is not obvious how a transfer by operation of law should be treated, the drafters of the
Copyright Act were aware of the phenomenon, mentioning transfers by operation of law
in conjunction with means of conveyances as ways in which ownership of a copyright
could be transferred. 46

¶13

35

See PERILLO, supra note 26, § 3.10.
Reply Brief of Appellants Novelis Corp. and Alcan Corp. (Final) at 7, Cincom Sys., Inc. v. Novelis
Corp., 581 F.3d 431 (6th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-4142), 2008 WL 3973688.
37
17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006) (copyright); 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2006) (patent).
38
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996).
39
Cincom Sys. Inc. v. Novelis Corp., No. 1:05CV152, 2007 WL 128999, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 12,
2007), aff’d, 581 F.3d 431 (6th Cir. 2009).
40
See Carole A. Quinn & R. Scott Weide, Violation of the Erie Doctrine: Application of a Rule of
Federal Common Law to Issues of Patent License Transferability, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1121, 1134
(1999) (citing O’Melveny & Myers v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994)).
41
35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006).
42
17 U.S.C. § 201 (2006).
43
Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 284 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re
Patient Educ. Media, Inc., 210 B.R. 237, 240 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997).
44
See Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226 (1886); Oliver v. Rumford Chem. Works, 109 U.S. 75 (1883);
Troy Iron & Nail Factory v. Corning, 55 U.S. 193 (1852); Unarco Indus., Inc. v. Kelley Co., 465 F.2d
1303, 1306 (7th Cir. 1972).
45
See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 25, § 6.71.
46
See JEROME K. MILLER, U.S. COPYRIGHT DOCUMENTS: AN ANNOTATED COLLECTION FOR USE BY
36
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¶15

The Sixth Circuit in Cincom relied on federal common law to determine that the
license in question was not assignable, stating that “federal common law governs
‘questions with respect to the assignability of a patent [or copyright] license.’” 47 The
court was justified in applying the precedent of an earlier patent case. 48 Relying on its
decision in PPG Industries, the court concluded that in the context of intellectual
property, “a license is presumed to be non-assignable and nontransferable in the absence
of ‘express provisions to the contrary.’” 49 Most importantly, the court found that “where
state law would allow for the transfer of a license absent express authorization, state law
must yield to the federal common law prohibiting such unauthorized transfers.” 50
¶16
The anti-assignability provision precluded the license in question in Cincom from
being classified as exclusive. As there is a true conflict between presumptions of
assignability by federal and state common law, the court in Cincom was correct in
adopting the federal common law presumption against the assignability of intellectual
property licenses. 51 A transfer by operation of law does not change this presumption. 52
The real question is whether the successor provision served as an adequate authorization
of the intra-group mergers that led to the transfer of the license. “Successor” has no fixed
legal meaning and should be interpreted in accordance with the surrounding
circumstances. 53 The software covered by the license continued to be “used for the same
operations on the same computer by the same people in the same place as set forth in the
Licensing Agreement.” 54 The corporation remained under the control of the same
operating company. In PPG Industries, on the other hand, the license was transferred to
a competitor, and no successor provision was present. 55
¶17
The presumption against assignability does not differentiate between noncompetitors and competitors, though, and the successor provision does not meet the high
standard set forth by federal common law—it hardly qualifies as an “express
authorization.” 56 This was a contract between sophisticated parties. If Cincom and
Novelis had intended the license to extend to subsidiaries or other corporate affiliates,
then they would have drafted the contract explicitly to do so. 57 The court in Cincom was

EDUCATORS AND LIBRARIANS § 204(a) (1981).
47
Cincom Sys., Inc. v. Novelis Corp., 581 F.3d 431, 436 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting PPG Indus., Inc. v.
Guardian Indus. Corp., 597 F.2d 1090, 1093 (6th Cir. 1979)).
48
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984) (citing United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 131 (1932);
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 657–58 (1834)).
49
Cincom, 581 F.3d at 436 (quoting PPG Indus., 597 F.2d at 1095).
50
Id. at 437.
51
See Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226 (1886); Oliver v. Rumford Chem. Works, 109 U.S. 75 (1883);
Troy Iron & Nail Factory v. Corning, 55 U.S. 193 (1852); Unarco Indus., Inc. v. Kelley Co., 465 F.2d
1303, 1306 (7th Cir. 1972).
52
PPG Indus., 597 F.2d at 1095–96.
53
FLETCHER, supra note 24, § 7203.
54
Reply Brief of Appellants, supra note 36, at 9.
55
PPG, 597 F.2d at 1096–97.
56
Cincom Sys., Inc. v. Novelis Corp., 581 F.3d 431, 436 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting PPG, 597 F.2d at
1095).
57
See ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES INC., FORM 8-K, at Ex.10.2 Patent Cross License Agreement (Nov.
17, 2009) (explicitly covering subsidiaries); SOUTHWEST IOWA RENEWABLE ENERGY, LLC, FORM 8-K, at
Grain Feedstock Supply Agreement (Dec. 22, 2008) (subsidiaries not mentioned).
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correct in interpreting federal common law to prohibit the transfer, despite its intra-group
nature.
D. Final Analysis
¶18

The Sixth Circuit ultimately came to the correct decision in Cincom. The treatment
of a transfer by operation of law was correct in the context of intellectual property
common law. However, the court should have clarified whether such a transfer would
have triggered the anti-assignability provision in a non-intellectual property contract. By
strictly applying a presumption against the assignability of non-exclusive licenses, the
court advanced the interests of the federal intellectual property system in giving
intellectual property owners strong control over their property. Both parties received
their bargained-for contract. Cincom presumably chose to seek a restricted license
agreement in order to protect against transfer to a competitor. More relevant to this
analysis, Novelis presumably accepted the restricted license agreement in order to
minimize the cost of the license.58 The court should not facilitate ex post buyer’s
remorse.
III. IMPLICATIONS

¶19

The decision of the Sixth Circuit in Cincom has implications for corporate
acquisitions as well as non-acquisitive mergers, and for both intellectual property license
and non-intellectual property contract negotiations. Part A explores the implications for
corporate acquisitions. Part B examines implications for non-acquisitive, or intra-group,
mergers. Part C and Part D look at intellectual property and non-intellectual property
contract negotiations, respectively.
A. Implications for corporate acquisitions

¶20

The approach taken in Cincom diminishes one of the advantages of a statutory
merger over an asset purchase: since contracts transfer by operation of law, the purchaser
will not need to seek third-party consents for contracts containing anti-assignability
provisions. 59 Consequently, the Cincom decision could potentially affect the stock versus
asset purchase decision analysis by a potential purchaser. The decision in Cincom does
not, however, appear to only be applicable to intellectual property licenses.
¶21
The decision in Cincom has numerous potential implications for corporate
acquisitions. For example, the increased risk generated by the decision will lead to
additional due diligence60 and may have a net effect of chilling acquisition activity. A
portion of the added value of the acquisition will be captured by the licensor of the
intellectual property in question, rather than go to the acquirer.
58
Motion from Cincom Sys., Inc. for Summary Judgment in Support at 8–10, Cincom Sys. Inc. v.
Novelis Corp., No. 1:05CV152, 2007 WL 128999 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 12, 2007) (No. 1:05CV152), 2006 WL
3669974 (Cincom had a policy of charging its initial license fee when it approved a transfer of a license
agreement. The inability to charge an additional, higher fee when there was a transfer likely would have
led Cincom to demand a higher annual fee from Novelis.).
59
See GEVURTZ, supra note 15, § 7.2.1(b).
60
See James J. Fuld, Some Practical Aspects of a Merger, 60 HARV. L. REV. 1092 (1947).
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¶22

Furthermore, corporations considering acquisitions will need to give greater
scrutiny to contractual obligations of the target company, particularly in regard to
intellectual property licenses. The prospect of other courts following the lead of the Sixth
Circuit by taking a strict view of intellectual property assignability creates additional risk
of sloppy due diligence, which leaves the acquirer vulnerable to potentially expensive
litigation. The somewhat vague language in the decision may give some companies
pause as to its effect on non-intellectual property contracts. Corporations engaging in an
acquisition do have the significant advantage, however, of being able to hedge against
this risk in the representations and warranties provisions of the purchase agreement.
¶23
There are two risks associated with the prospect of other courts following the lead
of the Sixth Circuit by taking a strict view of contract assignability. The first risk is that a
license lacking language in the contract allowing for assignment will be overlooked, and
the acquirer will be vulnerable to potentially expensive litigation by the licensor. The
second risk is that the licenses uncovered by due diligence will need to be renegotiated,
allowing the licensor to capture a slice of the value added by the acquisition. This will
result in both transaction costs (the cost to negotiate) and contract costs (the cost from the
negotiation). If the original contract terms have subsequently become unfavorable to the
licensor, the licensor will have the opportunity to negotiate more favorable terms.
Regardless, there is a hold-up problem. 61 The licensor will be able to negotiate more
favorable terms than it otherwise would because of the potentially tremendous costs to
the acquirer if the license is not renegotiated. 62
¶24
If the licensor can meet the traditional four-factor test, there is a significant risk that
a court will grant an injunction preventing the acquirer from using a patent entirely. 63
This could detract significantly from the value the acquirer expected to result from the
merger. It may even lead to a potential acquirer passing over an otherwise value-added
acquisition: “Oftentimes, a proposed merger or acquisition ‘gets canned or valued down’
following conflicts over intellectual property rights.” 64 However, this reflects the proper
allocation of value between the licensee, potential acquirer, and the patent owner. It also
provides protection for the intellectual property owner against its property falling into the
hands of a competitor.
¶25
The additional costs 65 and risks 66 resulting from the Cincom decision may have a
net chilling effect on acquisition. This effect will likely only be negligible in the
61

See Alan Devlin et al., Success, Dominance, and Interoperability, 84 IND. L.J. 1157, 1190–91 (2009)
(noting that the problem has been mitigated somewhat by recent decisions moving away from the automatic
granting of injunctions). See also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
62
The acquirer will be left with the option of either: (1) accepting the litigation risk of not renegotiating
the original license, (2) terminating the acquisition, or (3) dropping the license from the acquisition. The
obvious inferiority of either of these options will give the licensor significant leverage in negotiations. The
acquirer is also likely working under considerable time pressure. See generally LEIGH L. THOMPSON, THE
MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR (4th ed. 2009) (2001).
63
See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987);
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–13 (1982)). Note that this applies only to patent, not
copyright, licenses.
64
Shannon D. Kung, Comment, The Reverse Triangular Merger Loophole and Enforcing AntiAssignment Clauses, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1037, 1066 (2009) (quoting Lee Copeland, Due Diligence,
COMPUTERWORLD (Mar. 6, 2006),
http://www.computerworld.com/news/2000/story/0,11280,42836,00.html).
65
The acquirer will incur additional costs due to: (1) the additional due diligence necessary, (2) the cost
to renegotiate licenses, and (3) the cost from the license renegotiations.
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aggregate. The possible decrease in acquisition activity is outweighed by the policy
interest in protecting the property rights of the licensor and in enforcing an arm’s length
contract.
B. Implications for non-acquisitive corporate mergers
¶26

The decision in Cincom portends greater implications for non-acquisitive corporate
mergers than for corporate acquisitions. Companies do not complete due diligence of the
same rigor or scope for intra-group mergers as for acquisitions (nothing in the record
suggests that Novelis reviewed the license agreement prior to the intra-group mergers) 67
and they cannot protect themselves contractually with representations and warranties.
While the various risks of lackadaisical acquisition due diligence are well-documented,
far less attention is paid to due diligence for internal reorganizations. 68 Despite not
undergoing any substantive business change, a corporation may face a permanent
injunction preventing it from utilizing the patent license it contracted for at arm’s
length. 69 The risks discussed above are simply not a common factor in the business
decision to reorganize a corporate family.
¶27
These risks could result in significant unexpected costs 70 or the loss of the use of
intellectual property. 71 If management becomes aware of the risks during the planning
stage, they may choose to abort the intra-group mergers entirely. It is unlikely, however,
that a licensor would refuse to renegotiate a license if the proposed transaction would not
result in any substantive change to a licensee. Rather, they would merely have the
opportunity to capture some of the added value of the intra-group mergers. As the
originally negotiated price likely reflected the licensee’s willingness to forgo a provision
allowing it to transfer the license during an intra-group merger, the additional value
received is warranted.
C. Effect on initial intellectual property license negotiations
¶28

Cincom gives attorneys another factor to consider when negotiating intellectual
property licenses. It adds another layer of complexity to the process. As such, it will
lead to higher transactions costs—that is, the cost to negotiate. The interest of licensees
in the assignability of the license will give the licensor additional leverage. 72
¶29
The additional complexity will also increase risks associated with the contract. The
contracting parties may fail to properly address their intent regarding the assignability of
the license during a corporate reorganization. Initial awareness of the Cincom decision is
not likely to be widespread. There also remains a large degree of uncertainty regarding
the effect of the Cincom decision on other courts. A prudent planning attorney will
66
The acquirer will encounter: (1) the risk of overlooking licenses and (2) the risk that licenses will need
to be renegotiated.
67
Motion from Cincom Sys., supra note 58, at 8.
68
See Copeland, supra note 64.
69
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of
Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–13 (1982)).
70
See supra note 65.
71
See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (citing Amoco Prod. Co., 480 U.S. at 542; Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 311–
13).
72
See supra note 62.
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explicitly address the effect of internal reorganizations on license anti-assignment
provisions going forward. At the initial negotiating stage, the additional cost to secure
such a provision should be negligible as the licensor does not have the same negotiating
leverage it would have ex post. 73
D. Effect on non-intellectual property contracts
¶30

While Cincom involved an intellectual property license, its applicability to nonintellectual property contracts is unclear. Of particular concern is the language
dismissive of the traditional effect on anti-assignability provisions of transfers by
operation of law. The Cincom court only interpreted Ohio law, and the decision is only
binding authority in regard to Sixth Circuit decisions applying Ohio law.
¶31
The decision in Cincom will lead to additional complexity and risk in nonintellectual property contract negotiations as well as in intellectual property license
negotiations. This will lead to both additional contract risks 74 and transaction costs. 75 A
savvy planning attorney will address the effect of intra-group mergers on anti-assignment
provisions for non-intellectual property contracts as well.
IV. POLICY ANALYSIS

¶32

Proper conclusions regarding the treatment of licenses in corporate reorganizations
require an understanding of the various and competing interests involved. The federal
government and intellectual property owners have an interest in maintaining strong
property rights and freedom of contract for intellectual property owners.76 This conflicts
with the general aim of contract and corporate law to allow for the free flow of assets. 77
In more narrow terms, the owner of a copyright or patent that licenses that property has
two primary interests: (1) generating the maximum revenue from the license and (2)
preventing the license from falling into the hands of a competitor. 78 The licensee, on the
other hand, is interested in getting the maximum value out of the intellectual property at
the lowest cost (a cost-benefit analysis analyzing the two in tandem) and retaining as
much freedom as possible to engage in various business transactions. Setting aside
questions of federal preemption and other primarily legal concerns, this section will
evaluate how well various approaches meet these interests.

73

See supra note 62.
See supra note 66.
75
See supra note 65.
76
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (“The staple article
of commerce doctrine must strike a balance between a copyright holder’s legitimate demand for effective—
not merely symbolic—protection of statutory monopoly, and the rights of others to freely engage in
substantially unrelated areas of commerce.”).
77
See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 25, § 6.71.
78
The owner is also interested in preventing the license from falling into the hands of any party that is
not pre-approved for that matter. There is a certain amount of tension between delegating the use of the
intellectual property to another party in order to generate revenue from it while attempting to retain as
much control over it as possible. See Sung Yang, Considerations for the Patent Holder: The Transfer of
Patent Licenses in the Context of a Merger, 42 IDEA 515, 515 (2002).
74
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¶33

The formalist approach utilized in Cincom is economically efficient. It forces
parties to accept the terms bargained for ex ante and provides robust protection of the
licensor’s property rights.
¶34
Courts are currently divided between functional and formalist approaches to the
assignability of contracts transferred due to an acquisition (very little case law addressing
non-acquisitive mergers exists). 79 Part A looks at a “pure” functionalist approach. Part B
looks at the slightly more restrictive “adverse effects” approach established in
Trubowitch v. Riverbank Canning Co. 80 Parts C and D consider the merits of more
carefully tailored functionalist approaches. Part E looks at a strict formalist approach—
the most restrictive approach considered in the Note.
A. Pure Functionalist Approach

¶35

The pure functionalist approach is adopted in TXO Production Co. v. M.D. Mark,
Inc. 81 The court in TXO Production—interpreting Delaware, Texas, and Ohio corporate
law—found that a merger did not result in a transfer of the contracts of the merging
corporation. 82 Rather the contracts transferred by operation of law, and there was no
contract assignment. Thus, the court held that the anti-assignment provision of the
contract in question was not triggered. 83
¶36
If the pure functionalist approach had been applied to Cincom, the anti-assignment
provision would not have been triggered, so the court would never have gotten to the
point of applying either federal common law in regard to intellectual property or state law
in regard to contract interpretation. Novelis would have prevailed at the summary
judgment stage (if not earlier). 84 The court in Cincom explicitly rejected TXO
Production, despite the TXO Production court’s interpretation of Ohio corporate law. 85
¶37
The pure functionalist approach has its benefits. It provides a clear rule for
corporations incorporated in states with substantially similar corporate law provisions to
those in Delaware, Texas, and Ohio (which includes a majority of corporations). 86 This
simplifies merger due diligence and the resultant decision-making. 87 A lack of ambiguity
advances the general goal of the Model Business Corporation Act to promote uniformity
in commercial transactions. 88 Clear rules also help alleviate ever-present concerns about
adjudicatory efficiency, 89 concerns that must be taken into consideration when
79

See generally Kung, supra note 64 (discussing split between functionalist and formalist approaches).
182 P.2d 182 (Cal. 1947).
81
999 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. App. 1999).
82
Id. at 142 (relying on DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.82(A)(3)
(West 1997); TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.06 (West 1998); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 11.06 cmt.
(1996 Supp.)).
83
Id.
84
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (holding that to survive
summary judgment the party bearing the burden of proof must show more than a “metaphysical doubt as to
the material facts”).
85
Cincom Sys., Inc. v. Novelis Corp., 581 F.3d 431, 439 (6th Cir. 2009).
86
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW § 1.2(A) (2d ed. 2009).
87
Kung, supra note 64, at 1060.
88
Id. (citing generally to the MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 3.02–3.08 (1984)).
89
Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the Litigation Matrix,
57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1337 (2005) (“[T]he desire to achieve accuracy, while of great importance, must be
tempered by the often-competing considerations of efficiency and the need to avoid imposition of excessive
80
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considering substantive as well as procedural questions. The pure functionalist approach
also protects the preference for the assignability of contracts 90 and does not expose a
company engaging in an internal restructuring that results in no substantive change to its
business in the risk of liability for breaching an anti-assignment provision. 91
¶38
Overall, however, the disadvantages of the pure functionalist approach outweigh its
advantages. The protection it affords companies engaging in internal restructuring is
overly broad—it also protects companies merging with potential competitors of a
licensor. The reasoning employed by the TXO Production court would apply equally to a
corporation engaging in a reverse triangular merger with a direct competitor of a licensor.
In addition, it provides no additional protection to intellectual property owners. While
the TXO Production court accurately portrays the interests both in not chilling internal
reorganizations and in protecting the owners of intellectual property, its holding is not
narrowly tailored in such a way as to avoid having a negative effect on competing
interests.
B. Adverse Effect Approach
¶39

In Trubowitch, the California Supreme Court adopted an adverse effect test. 92
Trubowitch has been widely relied upon by courts adopting a functionalist approach 93 and
has also been extended to cover intellectual property licenses. 94 In determining whether a
non-intellectual property contract was breached due to a forward triangular merger, 95 the
court concluded that an anti-assignment clause does not prevent assignment by operation
of law, 96 and “if an assignment results merely from a change in the legal form of
ownership of a business, its validity depends upon whether it affects the interests of the
parties protected by the nonassignability of the contract.” 97
adjudicatory burdens.”) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (The three factors to be
balanced:
“First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”)).
90
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 25, § 6.71.
91
See supra note 66.
92
Trubowitch v. Riverbank Canning Co., 182 P.2d 182 (Cal. 1947).
93
See Sun World Corp. v. Pennysaver, Inc., 637 P.2d 1088 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); People ex rel. Dep’t
of Pub. Works v. McNamara Corp., 104 Cal. Rptr. 822 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); Sexton v. Nelson, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 407, 413–14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964).
94
Synenergy Methods v. Kelly Energy Sys., Inc., 695 F. Supp. 1362 (D.R.I. 1988); Superbrace, Inc. v.
Tidwell, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 404 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
95
To effect a forward triangular merger, the acquirer sets up a subsidiary as a shell corporation. The
shell is merged with the target corporation, resulting in the shell subsidiary as the surviving entity. See
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 86, § 3.4.
96
Trubowitch, 182 P.2d at 188 (“[A] provision against assignment in a contract or lease does not
preclude a transfer of the rights thereunder by operation of law.”) (citing Gazlay v. Williams, 210 U.S. 41,
47 (1908); Cal. Packing Corp. v. Lopez, 279 P. 664, 664 (Cal. 1929); Francis v. Ferguson, 159 N.E. 416
(N.Y. 1927); Farnum v. Hefner, 21 P. 955 (Cal. 1889)).
97
Id. (citing Gulf States Creosoting v. Loving, 120 F.2d 195, 199 (4th Cir. 1941); Fisher v. Berg, 290 P.
984 (Wash. 1930); Model Baking Co. v. Dittman, 266 S.W. 802, 803 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924); Walker v.
Mason, 116 A. 305 (Pa. 1922); Bradford & Carson v. Montgomery Furniture Co., 92 S.W. 1104 (Tenn.
1906)).
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¶40

To meet the test under the Trubowitch rule permitting transfer, the anti-assignment
provision notwithstanding, two conditions must be met: (1) the transfer must have
occurred through a change in the legal form of a business, and (2) the licensor will not be
adversely affected by the transfer. 98
¶41
As a transfer due to merger, the assignment of the copyright license in question in
Cincom met the first prong of the Trubowitch test. It is also very unlikely that Cincom
would have been adversely affected by the merger (at least in the traditional sense). The
corporations involved in the reorganization were all part of the same umbrella company.
Novelis was the substantial equivalent of Alcan Ohio from a business standpoint. The
question arises: if Cincom was not affected adversely, why did it pursue legal action?
Cincom had a policy of charging its standard initial license fee as a condition of approval
of an assignment; Novelis sought to avoid that additional cost. 99
¶42
A primary concern of a copyright or patent owner negotiating a license is that it
will end up in the hands of a company with which the owner would not have directly
contracted. The second prong of the Trubowitch test would appear to address this, but its
weakness is the difficulty of determining whether the licensor is adversely affected. The
licensor must resort to legal action to protect its property right, and then a court must
make judgments on a business outcome. The first prong of the test is overly broad. By
including all mergers, it encompasses any number of transactions that involve the transfer
of the license to a substantially different business. Although the primary concern of the
intellectual property owner is transfer to a competitor, there are various other factors that
affect the strategic decision the licensor makes regarding which company to license its
property to and which valuation to use in negotiating the price. The licensor chose to
negotiate both for the anti-assignment provision and to not include subsidiaries or other
related corporations within the scope of the license. The intellectual property owner has
a right to have these contract and property rights protected in a more robust fashion than
the adverse effect test provides.
C. Corporate Income Tax Reorganization Approach
¶43

The general rule in corporate law is to respect the form of the transaction, 100 unlike
in contract law which sometimes considers surrounding circumstances for contract
interpretation. 101 There is little differentiation made between acquisitive and nonacquisitive mergers in the eyes of the law. 102 One significant example of putting
substance over form in regard to mergers is the treatment for corporate income tax
purposes. 103 This Note will focus on F-reorganizations, with some consideration of Dreorganizations. 104
98

SQL Solutions v. Oracle Corp., No. C-91-1079 MHP, 1991 WL 626458, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18,
1991).
99
Motion from Cincom Sys., supra note 58, at 8–9.
100
See Hariton v. Arco Elecs., 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963). But see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 86, § 12.4.
101
See PERILLO, supra note 26, § 3.10; Morgan v. Boyer, 39 Ohio St. 324, 326 (Ohio 1883).
102
Delaware corporate law respects the form of the transaction. See Hariton, 188 A.2d at 123. But see
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 86, § 12.4.
103
DOUGLAS A. KHAN ET AL., CORPORATE INCOME TAXATION §§ 9.04, 9.05 (6th ed. 2009).
104
For corporate income tax purposes, reorganizations are known by the letter corresponding to one of
seven subparagraphs of § 368(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code. KHAN, supra note 103, § 9.04; 26
U.S.C. § 368(a)(1) (2006). Other types of non-acquisitive reorganizations are G-reorganizations
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¶44

An F-reorganization is defined as “a mere change in identity, form, or place of
organization of one corporation, however effected.” 105 While a formalist reading of the
1982 changes to the F-reorganization provision of the Code 106 would reduce it to virtually
nil, in practice the Internal Revenue Service (the Service) has made evident that multiple
corporations can be involved in the reorganization as long as one operating company is
involved. 107
¶45
Unfortunately, the Service has given little additional guidance as to what
constitutes a single operating company. 108 The Service has stated there must be no
change in the shareholders or corporate assets, 109 but the absolute shareholder continuity
requirement has eroded substantially over time. 110
¶46
Multiple transactions are not considered together for the F-reorganization
analysis. 111 The three separate corporate changes involved in the larger Novelis corporate
reorganization 112 would be viewed independently. The final transaction, the change from
Alcan Fabrication Corporation to Novelis easily meets the F-reorganization test. A
“mere change in identity, form, or place” is the quintessential F-reorganization. 113 The
other two transactions are more problematic. The change in state of incorporation falls
under the traditional definition of an F-reorganization.114 While the other two
transactions may not qualify as F-reorganizations, together they are structured as
quintessential divisive D-reorganizations. 115
¶47
There are benefits to courts piggybacking off of corporate income tax rules to
determine whether a merger should trigger an anti-assignment provision. Corporate
income tax already recognizes the value in differentiating between acquisitive and nonacquisitive mergers and as such provides pre-existing doctrine. Tax law is concerned
with substance over form, which is appropriate for responding to a transfer due to intragroup mergers, because only a change in form occurs. Because the corporate tax
reorganization approach allows for differentiation between substance and form, the
drawbacks to an approach encompassing corporate acquisitions are avoided. The federal
government also looks to substance over form in areas of the law other than tax. 116
(bankruptcy reorganizations), E-reorganizations (recapitalizations), and some D-reorganizations (divisive
reorganizations). KHAN, supra note 103, §§ 9.04, 9.05.
105
26 U.S.C. § 368(a)(1)(F).
106
The Internal Revenue Code, Title 26 of the United States Code.
107
Rev. Rul. 96-29, 1996-1 C.B. 50.
108
KHAN, supra note 103, § 9.05.13.
109
Rev. Rul. 96-29, 1996-1 C.B. 50. There is an exception if dissenters owning less than one percent of
the outstanding corporate shares do not participate in the transaction.
110
KHAN, supra note 103, § 9.05.13.
111
Id.
112
Alcan Ohio first merged into Alcan Corporation, a corporate affiliate (1). Alcan Corporation then
merged into its three Texas subsidiary corporations: Alcan Products Corporation, Alcan Primary Products
Corporation, and Alcan Fabrication Corporation (2). Alcan Fabrication Corporation subsequently changed
its corporate name to Novelis Corporation (3). Cincom Sys. Inc. v. Novelis Corp., No. 1:05CV152, 2007
WL 128999, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 12, 2007).
113
KHAN, supra note 103, § 9.05.13 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 368(a)(1)(F) (2006)).
114
Id.
115
Id. § 9.05.13, n.194 (“In general, a corporate division . . . qualifies as a D reorganization if it involves
two steps: the drop-down of a trade or business to a controlled subsidiary, followed by the qualifying spinoff of the subsidiary.”) (D reorganizations are also given tax-free treatment).
116
See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984) (“The
coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary must be viewed as that of a single
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One significant drawback to a substance-oriented approach is that it can lead to
uncertainty and increased litigation. 117 This is a lesser consideration for corporate income
tax than for intellectual property law, because in tax the government retains the decision
to challenge the tax treatment claimed by the corporation. Tax cases can be tried in
specialized legislative courts. The lack of well-defined doctrine in corporate income tax
law regarding non-acquisitive reorganizations exacerbates this uncertainty. 118 More
importantly, ignoring the intent of contracting parties prevents ex ante planning and
changes ex post the bargained-for benefit. Another drawback to piggybacking off
doctrine in another area of the law is the risk that the interests of the two respective areas
of law will diverge at some point in the future.
D. A Specifically-Tailored Approach

¶49

The non-acquisitive reorganization approach used in corporate income tax may not
be appropriate to lift wholesale into this particular area of the law, but it could still be
leveraged. Any approach must protect intellectual property owners from having their
licenses fall into the hands of competitors. They should also be protected from a
fundamental and sudden change in the business and identity of the licensee. Courts
should articulate a clear approach so that parties can contract around any functionalist
exceptions to the default rule against assignability if they truly intend to do so.
¶50
Rather than looking only at the discrete corporation that holds the license, courts
could consider the entire operating company. A sophisticated party does not contract
with a wholly-owned subsidiary without considering and acknowledging the presence
and influence of the corporate parent. 119 If this is true, there is no change in their interests
in relation to the operating company due to the intra-group mergers. 120 If the mergers
result in no change to the operating company, the anti-assignability provision would not
be triggered as a matter of contract law. This would provide most of the advantages of
any clean rule 121 by giving the licensor the information it needs to evaluate the effect of a
merger by the licensee on its property rights. 122 By viewing a merger in its totality, rather
than as a series of individual transactions, this approach avoids the risk that companies
will structure their transactions to circumvent anti-assignability provisions. This
approach would, however, provide a windfall for current licensees that negotiated their
licenses according to the understanding that a contract signed just for the subsidiary
would apply only to the subsidiary. It would also introduce uncertainty regarding what
constitutes an acceptable merger, thus potentially leading to more litigation.

enterprise for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act.”).
117
See Redish, supra note 89, at 1337.
118
See KHAN, supra note 103, § 9.05.13.
119
See supra note 57.
120
If their interests in relation to the operating company have changed, it is due to circumstances
changing as time passes. This is an inevitable risk inherent to licensing, and the law should not give
licensors a “free pass” to mitigate it ex post.
121
See Redish, supra note 89, at 1337.
122
As a (presumably) sophisticated party, the licensor is well-qualified to judge whether the operating
company it previously contracted with was fundamentally changed by the merger. Of greater concern is
putting the evaluation in the hands of judges if the licensor does decide to pursue recourse, but that concern
is somewhat less important due to its removal of one step from the initial decision.
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E. Formalist Approach
¶51

A number of courts have taken a formalist approach when interpreting antiassignment provisions triggered by mergers, particularly for intellectual property
The formalist approach holds that mergers violate anti-assignment
licenses. 123
provisions, interpreting those provisions using only the plain meaning. 124 The
functionalist approach taken by some courts has been criticized in favor of a strict
formalist approach. 125
¶52
The court in Cincom followed the formalist approach; under the formalist
approach, Novelis violated the anti-assignment provision in its license with Cincom. The
plain meaning of the contract prohibited assignment, and the merger clearly resulted in a
transfer of the license.
¶53
A formalist approach offers several attractive advantages. It furthers the goal of
federal intellectual property law of giving the owner quasi-monopolistic control. This
robust protection of property rights encourages innovation. It corresponds with the most
common approach of corporate law by respecting the form of a transaction. 126 It also
offers additional advantages due to its clear guidance for corporate lawyers. 127 It
prevents parties from, in effect, renegotiating a contract ex post through the court system.
¶54
However, there are some drawbacks to a strict formalist approach. It may subvert
the intent of the contracting parties—they may very well have assumed and intended the
contract to not be affected by an intra-group merger—by preventing the use of
surrounding circumstances to supplement the plain meaning of the contract. 128 In
addition, it provides broad protection of the property rights of licensors by providing for
the enforcement of anti-assignability provisions in instances of limited harm to the
licensor. 129 In doing so, it restricts the alienability of contracts, in contravention to the
general policy favored by courts 130 and the general principle that anti-assignment
provisions are to be narrowly interpreted. 131 Overall, however, the respect shown by the
formalist approach to the contract and property rights of the intellectual property is
laudable, and it is preferable to any of the other approaches discussed.
V. CONCLUSION
¶55

Cincom is not a shocking result given existing precedent, but it will still likely
catch many companies off-guard. This is largely because a decision that sorts out the
competing interests of several areas of the law can seem illogical when viewed through
123

See Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2002); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp.,
597 F.2d 1090 (6th Cir. 1979); Unarco Indus., Inc. v. Kelley Co., 465 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1972); SQL
Solutions v. Oracle, No. C-91-1079 MHP, 1991 WL 626458, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1991).
124
Kung, supra note 64, at 1049.
125
Id. at 1049–52.
126
See Hariton v. Arco Elecs., 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963). But see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 86, § 12.4.
127
See Redish, supra note 89, at 1337.
128
See PERILLO, supra note 26, § 3.10.
129
It should be noted that, as a practical matter, this is a somewhat limited concern as the choice to
enforce the anti-assignment provision remains with the licensor; if the licensor suffers no harm from the
assignment the licensor can simply choose not to pursue legal action. But this still is a concern.
130
See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 25, § 6.71.
131
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317 (1981) (“A contractual right can be assigned.”).
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the prism of a single set of interests. The Sixth Circuit decision is unfortunately likely
only to exacerbate, rather than alleviate, confusion and uncertainty around the treatment
of anti-assignment provisions in relation to mergers. This is a concern that courts should
address by continuing to apply the formalist approach taken in Cincom, while using clear
language regarding the treatment of non-intellectual property contracts.
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